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Abstract
This paper presents an exact penalization theory of the generalized Nash equilibrium problem
(GNEP) that has its origin from the renowned Arrow-Debreu general economic equilibrium
model. While the latter model is the foundation of much of mathematical economics, the GNEP
provides a mathematical model of multi-agent non-cooperative competition that has found many
contemporary applications in diverse engineering domains. The most salient feature of the
GNEP that distinguishes it from a standard non-cooperative (Nash) game is that each player’s
optimization problem contains constraints that couple all players’ decision variables. Extending
results for stand-alone optimization problems, the penalization theory aims to convert the GNEP
into a game of the standard kind without the coupled constraints, which is known to be more
readily amenable to solution methods and analysis. Starting with an illustrative example to
motivate the development, the paper focuses on two kinds of coupled constraints, shared (i.e.,
common) and finitely representable. Constraint residual functions and the associated error
bound theory play an important role throughout the development.
1 Introduction
The Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP) extends the classical Nash Equilibrium Prob-
lem (NEP) by allowing individual players’ constraints, in addition to the payoff functions, to depend
on rival players’ strategies. This extension adds considerably descriptive and explanatory power for
the GNEP to model non-cooperative competition among multiple selfish decision-making agents.
Since its introduction in the 1950’s [13, 1] (where the terms social equilibrium and abstract economy
were used), the GNEP has risen beyond its mathematical-economic origin and become a common
paradigm for various engineering disciplines. This model fits well in a non-cooperative game setting
where all players share some common resources or limitations. Thus some of the players’ constraints
are coupled ; these are in addition to the players’ private constraints that do not contain the rival
players’ decision variables. Sources of the GNEP include infrastructure systems such as communi-
cation or radio systems [49, 50], power grids [57, 35], transportation networks [5], modern traffic
systems with e-hailing services [4], supply and demand constraints for transportation systems [54],
and pollution quota for environmental application [40, 7]. We refer the readers to [22, 27, 30] for
more detailed surveys on this active research topic and its many applications. The four chapters
by Facchinei published in [12, pages 151–188] contain a historical account of the GNEP, provide
many references, and summarize the advances up to the year 2012.
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Due to the presence of the coupling constraints, solving a GNEP is a significantly more challenging
task than solving a NEP. Depending on the types of the coupling constraints, a GNEP can be
divided into two categories. The first category is the shared-constrained case, where the coupling
constraints are common to all players. [In the literature, this case has also been called jointly
constrained, or common constrained; we adopt the “shared-constrained” terminology in this paper.]
Many engineering problems cited in last paragraph are of this type. The second type is more general
in which the coupling constraints can be specific to each player and different among the players. Due
to the relative simplicity and direct connections to many engineering problems, shared-constrained
GNEPs receive most of the attention in the literature. Particularly, much effort has been spent
on obtaining a special kind of equilibrium solutions, called variational equilibrium, under various
settings and assumptions. Such an equilibrium has its origin from [52]; the term “variational
equilibrium” was coined in [22] and further explored in many papers that include [21, 27, 22, 42]
where additional references can be found. In turn, the adjective “variational” was employed to
express that this kind of equilibria of a GNEP can be described as solutions of a variational
inequality [34, 25] obtained by concatenating the first-order conditions of the players’ optimization
problems. Alternatively, a Nikaido-Isoda-type bi-function [46] has been used extensively [41, 39, 56]
as an attempt to formulate a GNEP as a single optimization problem. In general, the existence of
a variational equilibrium often relies on the convexity and certain boundedness assumptions and
suitable constraint qualifications [27]. While computationally simpler and providing a special kind
of solutions, a variational equilibrium does not always have a clear advantage over a non-variational
equilibrium solution. It is hence difficult to argue that special focus should be placed on finding such
a particular equilibrium. Nevertheless, computing a non-variational equilibrium solution is more
complex and less understood. Yet there has been some literature on this subject. For example,
an extension of the class of variational equilibria is studied in [31, 44], and algorithms aiming at
obtaining the entire set of solutions of special class of GNEPs are considered in [28, 19, 3]. The
paper [53] discusses the numerical solution of an affine GNEP by Lemke’s method with an attempt
to compute generalizations of variational equilibria.
With the goal of exploiting the advances in the NEPs, this paper revisits and sharpens an exact
penalization theory for GNEPs whereby the coupled constraints, shared or otherwise, are moved
from the constraints to the objective functions via constraint residual functions scaled by a penalty
parameter. Dating back to the beginning of nonlinear programming [29], exact penalization for
optimization has been a subject of intensive study in the early days of optimization (see [33]) and
much research has been undertaken by the Italian School led by Di Pillo, Facchinei and Grippo
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Exemplified by these works and references therein, this theory deals largely with
problems whose constraints are defined by differentiable inequalities and relies on the multipliers of
these constraints. The papers [9, 8] discuss how penalty functions can be used to design numerical
methods for solving nonlinear programs that have been implemented in the very successful knitro
software [10]. For the GNEP, exact penalty results are derived in [26, 24] which also discuss algo-
rithmic design. The paper [23] discusses extensive computational rules for updating the penalty
parameter and reports numerical results with the resulting algorithms. Contrary to exact penaliza-
tion, inexact, or asymptotic penalization also penalizes the constraints but the penalty parameter
is required to tend to infinity to recover a solution of the given problem. A fairly simple iterative
inexact-penalty based method for solving the GNEP was discussed in [48]; this method cast the
game as a quasi variational inequality obtained by concatenating the first-order optimality condi-
tions of the players’ nonlinear programs. The recent papers [36, 37] expanded the latter paper and
discussed augmented Lagrangian and exact penalty methods for the GNEP and the more general
quasi-variational inequality, respectively.
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In contrast to the multiplier-based exact penalization, the principle of exact penalization, first
established in [11, Proposition 2.4.3] and subsequently generalized in [25, Theorem 6.8.1] deals
with the exact penalization of an abstract constraint set. The latter result makes it clear that this
theory is closely connected to the theory of error bounds [6, 43] and [25, Chapter 6]. To date,
this approach has not been applied to the GNEP; part of the goal of this paper is to establish how
exact penalty results for the GNEP can be derived based on an error-bound theory. Unlike a stand-
alone optimization problem, a GNEP has multiple inter-connected optimization problems each with
an objective function of its own; thus while exact penalty results for the players’ optimization
problems are available, simply putting them together does not readily yield an exact penalty result
for a GNEP. The inter-connection between the players’ optimization problems will need to be
accounted for when the coupling constraints are penalized. Furthermore, while most literature
on the exact penalization of the GNEP considers only coupling inequality constraints, see e.g.,
[23, 24, 31, 36]; another goal of this paper is to bring inequality coupling constraints to the study of
exact penalization. By means of an illustrative example, we show that care is needed in choosing
the constraint residual functions in order for the conversion to a penalized NEP to be valid. This
example also paves the way for the theory to be developed subsequently. It is worth noting that the
`q residual functions for q ∈ (1,∞) present certain advantages in guaranteeing exact penalization
of GNEP. This class of residual functions is used in [24] and [12, Chapter 3 Section 4.1]. This paper
also takes advantage of them in finitely representable cases; Sections 4 and 5 therein elucidate the
advantageous functional properties of `q residual functions in exact penalization.
2 Preliminary Discussion and Review
In this section, we present the setting of this paper and fix the notations to be used throughout.
We begin with the definition of the GNEP, then review some relevant concepts and the principle of
exact penalization for an optimization problem, and finally end with an illustration of this principle
applied to a simple GNEP and a preliminary result.
2.1 The GNEP
Formally, a GNEP consists of N selfish players each of whom decides a strategy with the goal
to minimize (or maximize) his/her cost (or payoff). Let xν ∈ Rnν denote the decision of player
ν ∈ [N ] , {1, · · · , N}. Anticipating the rival players’ strategies x−ν , (xν ′)ν ′ 6=ν , player ν ∈ [N ]
solves the following minimization problem in his/her own variable xν :
minimize
xν∈C ν
θν(x
ν , x−ν)
subjectto xν ∈ Xν(x−ν), (1)
where θν(x
ν , x−ν) denotes the cost function of player ν as a function of the pair (xν , x−ν); the
constraints are of two types: those described by the private strategy set C ν ⊆ Rnν and the others
described by the coupled constraint set Xν(x−ν) ⊆ Rnν that depends on the rival players’ strategy
tuple x−ν . [Writing (xν , x−ν) in the argument of θν(•) is to emphasize player ν’s strategy xν and
does not mean that the tuple x , (xν)Nν=1 ∈ Rn, where n ,
∑
ν∈[N ]
nν , is reordered such that x
ν is the
first block.] This setup clearly indicates that both the objective function and constraint set of each
player’s optimization problem are coupled by all players’ strategies. Let θ(x) , (θν(xν , x−ν))Nν=1
be the concatenation of the players’ objective functions; C ,
∏
ν∈[N ]
C ν be the concatenation of the
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players’ private constraints, and X : Rn → Rn with X(x) ,
∏
ν∈[N ]
Xν(x−ν) be the multifunction
concatenating the players’ coupled constraints. We use the triplet (C,X; θ) to denote the GNEP
with players’ optimization problems defined by (1). A tuple x∗ , (x∗,ν)ν∈[N ] is a Nash Equilibrium
(NE) of this game if x∗,ν ∈ argmin
xν∈C ν ∩Xν(x∗,−ν)
θ(xν , x∗,−ν) for all ν ∈ [N ].
By considering Xν as a multifunction from Rn−ν into Rnν , where n−ν , n − nν , the constraint
xν ∈ Xν(x−ν) is equivalent to the membership that (xν , x−ν) belongs to the graph of Xν , which is
denoted by graph(Xν) ⊆ Rn. An important special case of the GNEP (C,X; θ) is when these graphs
are all equal to a common set D ⊆ Rn. This is the case of common coupled constraints, which
we call shared constraints. We denote this special case by the triplet (C,D; θ). If each function
θν(•, x−ν) is differentiable and convex and the set C ∩D is convex, then a special kind of NE of the
GNEP (C,D; θ) is that derived from the variational inequality, denoted by VI (C∩D; Θ), of finding
a vector x¯ ∈ C ∩D such that (y − x¯)TΘ(x¯) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ C ∩D, where Θ(x) , (∇xνθν(x))ν∈[N ].
Such a special NE is a called a variational equilibrium. When the graphs graph(Xν) are not the
same, NEs of the GNEP (C,X; θ) are related to solutions of a quasi-variational inequality; see e.g.
[48] for details.
Another important special case of the GNEP (C,X; θ) is when each set Xν(x−ν) is finitely repre-
sentable, i.e., when
Xν(x−ν) ,
{
xν ∈ Rnν | g ν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0 and hν(xν , x−ν) = 0} (2)
for some functions (g ν , h ν) : Rn → Rmν+pν with some positive integers mν and pν . Typically, such
constraint functions g ν and hν are such that gν(•, x−ν) is differentiable and each of its component
functions g νi (•, x−ν) is convex and hν(•, xν) is affine; in this case, the set Xν(x−ν) is both closed
and convex; see Section 5.
A road map. For the GNEP (C,X; θ) and its special cases, exact penalization aims to convert
these games with coupled constraints to standard games whereby the constraint set Xν(x−ν) for
each player is moved to the objective function via a residual function (see definition in the next
subsection) scaled by a penalty parameter ρ, thereby obtaining a NEP (C; θρ) for a concatenated
penalized objective θρ, whose solution is a solution of the given GNEP. Notice that we retain the
private constraints described by the set C ν in each player’s optimization problem. Thus this is
a type of partial exact penalization [24]. The development in the rest of this paper is as follows.
We first present an illustrative example which reveals important insights into exact penalization of
GNEP, then consider the penalization of the GNEP (C,D; θ) with common coupled constraints and
general closed convex sets C and D with no particular structure. The latter part is concluded with
the case where D is finitely representable by convex inequalities and linear equalities. Finally, we
discuss the GNEP (C,X; θ) by penalizing the coupled constraints defined as in (2). We should note
that the literature on exact penalization of the GNEP has dealt largely with the latter problem
under constraint qualifications, such as the sequentially bounded CQ [26, 48] and the Extended
Mangasarian-Fromovitz constraint qualification (EMFCQ) [23, 24, 31, 36]. In this paper, we have
provided results for exact penalization of GNEP under a strong descent assumption and a Lipschitz
error bound assumption for residual functions, see Proposition 3, Theorem 5 and Corollary 8, and
a Slater-type condition for the coupled constraints, see Theorem 10 and 11.
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2.2 Relevant concepts
We introduce in this subsection some relevant concepts that are used later. A function Φ : Rn → Rm
is said to be Lipschitz continuous on a set S ⊆ Rn if, for some positive scalar LipΦ, the following
holds:
|Φ(x)− Φ(y) | ≤ LipΦ ‖x− y ‖2, ∀x, y ∈ S.
This is also referred to as Lipschitz continuity with constant LipΦ. In addition, Φ is said to
be Lipschitz continuous near a point x if, for some ε > 0, Φ is Lipschitz continuous in the ε-
neighborhood of x. We hence say that Φ is locally Lipschitz continuous on S if it is Lipschitz
continuous near every point in S. The directional derivative of Φ at a point x ∈ Rn in a direction
d ∈ Rn is defined to be
Φ ′(x; d) , lim
τ↓0
Φ(x+ τd)− Φ(x)
τ
(3)
if the limit exists. If the above limit exists for all d ∈ Rn, Φ is said to be directionally differentiable
at x. It is clear that if Φ is Lipschitz continuous with constant LipΦ near x¯, then ‖Φ ′(x¯; d) ‖ (if
the derivative exists) is bounded by LipΦ ‖ d ‖ for all d.
For two given closed subsets S and T of Rn, a function rS : Rn → R+ is a T -residual function of S
if for all x ∈ T , it holds that rS(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ S, or equivalently if and only if x ∈ S ∩T .
Note that this definition allows for S and T to have an empty intersection; in this case, the residual
function rS is positive on T . Such a residual function rS(x) is said to yield a T -Lipschitz error
bound of S if there exist a constant γ > 0 such that
dist(x;S ∩ T ) ≤ γ rS(x), ∀x ∈ T,
where dist(x;Z) , minimum
y∈Z
‖ y−x ‖2 is the distance function to a closed set Z under the Euclidean
norm. These definitions extend the usual concepts of a residual function and associated error bound
of a set S which pertain to the case when T = Rn. In essence, we are interested in such quantities
only for elements in the subset T ; thus the restriction to the latter set. If S is finitely representable
defined by the m-dimensional vector function g and the p-dimensional vector function h as in (2),
we define the `q residual function of S for a given q ∈ [1,∞] as
rq(x) ,
∥∥∥∥∥
(
g+(x)
h(x)
)∥∥∥∥∥
q
, (4)
where g+(x) , max(g(x), 0) and ‖•‖q is the `q-norm of vectors. If each gi, i ∈ [m] is convex and h is
affine, then rq is convex for all 1 ≤ q ≤ ∞. Moreover, if these defining functions are differentiable,
then for q ∈ (1,∞), rq(x) is differentiable at x 6∈ S. Its gradient is given as follows:
∇rq(x) = 1
rq−1q (x)
 ∑
i∈[m]
(
g+i (x)
)q−1 ∇gi(x) + ∑
j∈[p]
|hj(x) |q−1 ( sgn hj(x) )∇hj(x)
 , (5)
where sgn (•) is the sign function of a scalar defined to be 1 for positive numbers, -1 for negative
numbers, and 0 for 0. In the same case, the function rq(x) is directional differentiable at all x ∈ S
and its directional derivative is given by:
r ′q(x; d) =
 ∑
i: gi(x)=0
[ max(∇gi(x)Td, 0) ]q +
∑
j:hj(x)=0
| ∇hj(x)Td |q
1/q , (6)
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As for q = 1, r1(x) is not differentiable but directional differentiable and its directional derivative
is given by:
r ′1(x; d) =
∑
i: gi(x)>0
∇gi(x)Td+
∑
i: gi(x)=0
max(∇gi(x)Td, 0 )+∑
j:hj(x)=0
| ∇hj(x)Td |+
∑
j:hj(x)6=0
( sgn hj(x) )∇hj(x)Td.
(7)
2.3 Partial exact penalization
Exact penalization of GNEPs has its origin from its counterpart for solving constrained optimization
problems. As such, we begin by considering the following general constrained optimization problem:
minimize
x∈W ∩S
f(x), (8)
where W and S represent two sets of constraints with S considered more complex than W . By
penalizing the violation of membership in S, a penalty formulation transforms (8) into the following
penalized optimization problem:
minimize
x∈W
f(x) + ρ rS(x), (9)
where ρ > 0 is a penalty parameter to be specified and rS(x) is a W -residual function of the set
S. The penalization is said to be exact for (8) if there exists a positive scalar ρ¯ such that, for all
ρ ≥ ρ¯, every global minimizer of the penalized problem is also a global minimizer of (8) and vice
versa. Note: Dealing with minimizers, this definition is a classical one. In this regard, the defini-
tion is computationally most meaningful when both (8) and (9) are convex programs. Otherwise,
the equivalence between the minimizers is a conceptual property that offers guidance to solve con-
strained problems in practical algorithms via relaxations of some constraints. Subsequently, when
we apply this optimization theory to the GNEP, we will make some needed convexity assumptions
so that we can freely talk about minimizers.
It is important to note that the penalized problem (9) is different from the usual one as discussed
in [25, Section 6.8] which is:
minimize
x∈W
f(x) + ρ rS∩W (x), (10)
where rS∩W (x) is a residual function of the intersection S ∩ W in the unrestricted sense. As
such, while the result below is similar to [25, Theorem 6.8.1], they differ in several ways: one,
the penalized problems are different; two, the error bound conditions are different; and three, the
result below does not pre-assume the solvability of either (8) or (9). This is in contrast to the
solvability assumption that is needed for one inclusion of the two argmin sets in the cited theorem.
For completeness, we offer a detailed proof of the result below which does not explicitly assume
convexity of the functions involved.
Theorem 1. Consider the nonlinear program (8) with closed sets W and S and a Lipschitz con-
tinuous objective function f with constant Lipf > 0 on the set W . Assume that S ∩ W 6= ∅. Let
rS(x) be a W -residual function of the set S satisfying a W -Lipschitz error bound for the set S with
constant γ > 0; i.e., rS(x) ≥ γdist(x;S ∩W ) for all x ∈W . Then for all ρ > Lipf/γ,
argmin
x∈S∩W
f(x) = argmin
x∈W
f(x) + ρ rS(x).
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Proof. In the following two-part proof, we may assume without loss of generality that both argmin
sets are nonempty. We first show that the left-hand argmin is a subset of the right-hand argmin.
Let x¯ be an element of argmin
x∈S∩W
f(x). Let x ∈ W be arbitrary. Let x̂ be a vector in S ∩ W such
that ‖x− x̂‖2 = dist(x;S ∩W ). We have
f(x) + ρ rS(x) ≥ f(x) + ρ γ ‖x− x̂ ‖2 by the W -Lipschitz error bound
≥ f(x̂)− Lipf ‖x− x̂ ‖2 + ρ γ ‖x− x̂ ‖2 by the Lipschitz continuity of f
≥ f(x̂) by the choice of ρ
≥ f(x¯) = f(x¯) + ρ rS(x¯) by the optimality of x¯.
This establishes one inclusion. For the converse, let x∗ ∈ argmin
x∈W
f(x) + ρ rS(x). It suffices to show
that x∗ ∈ S. Let x˜ be a vector in S ∩ W such that ‖x∗ − x˜‖2 = dist(x∗;S ∩W ). We have
f(x˜) ≥ f(x∗) + ρ rS(x∗) by the optimality of x∗
≥ f(x∗) + ρ γ ‖x∗ − x˜ ‖2 by the W -Lipschitz error bound
≥ f(x˜)− Lipf ‖x∗ − x˜‖2 + ρ γ ‖x∗ − x˜ ‖2 by the Lipschitz continuity of f
≥ f(x˜) by the choice of ρ.
Therefore, x∗ = x˜, establishing the claim and the equality of the two sets of minimizers.
We will apply Theorem 1 to the GNEP (C,X; θ) by penalizing the coupled constraint set Xν(x−ν)
in each player ν’s optimization problem. Letting C −ν ,
∏
ν ′ 6=ν
C ν
′
and rν(•, x−ν) be a C ν-residual
function of the set Xν(x−ν) for given x−ν ∈ C −ν , we obtain the following penalized subproblem
for player ν with respect to given x−ν :
minimize
xν ∈C ν
θν(x
ν , x−ν) + ρ rν(xν , x−ν) (11)
where ρ > 0 is a penalty parameter which we take for simplicity to be the same for all players. Let
rX(x) , (rν(x))Nν=1 and θρ;X , θ + ρ rX . Then the optimization problems (11) concatenated for
all ν ∈ [N ] define the game (C; θρ;X) which is clearly a NEP. We say that exact penalization holds
for the GNEP (C,X; θ) with residual function rX if there exists a scalar ρ¯ > 0 such that, for all
ρ ≥ ρ¯, every equilibrium solution of the NEP (C; θρ;X) is also an equilibrium solution of the GNEP
(C,X; θ) and vise versa. The following example drawn from [27] illustrates this penalization.
Example 2. Consider the shared-constrained GNEP (C,D; θ) with the following specifications:
N = 2; n1 = n2 = 1; θ1(x) = (x1−1)2; θ2(x) = (x2−1/2)2; C = R2, and D = {x ∈ R2 |x1+x2 ≤ 0}.
The set of equilibria of this GNEP is {(α, 1−α) | 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1}. The set of variational equilibria of
the GNEP is a singleton containing (3/4, 1/4). With ρ > 0 as the penalty parameter, the penalized
NEP is defined by the following two univariate optimization problems:
minimize
x1
(x1 − 1)2 + ρ (x1 + x2 − 1 )+ minimize
x2
(
x2 − 12
)2
+ ρ (x1 + x2 − 1 )+
that employ the common residual function rD(x) = (x1 + x2 − 1 )+. The set of equilibria of the
latter NEP is obtained by investigating the three cases shown in Table 1. From the table, we
conclude that the given GNEP has an exact penalization as a standard NEP. 
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x∗1 x∗2 equilibria set for ρ ≥ 1
x1 + x2 > 1 1− ρ/2 3/2− ρ ∅
x1 + x2 < 1 1 3/2 ∅
x1 + x2 = 1 [1− ρ/2, 1] [1/2− ρ/2, 1/2] {(α, 1− α) | 1/2 ≤ α ≤ 1}
Table 1: Three cases of the penalized problem
The primary question this paper aims at addressing is under what conditions exact penalization
holds for the GNEP (C,X; θ) and its special cases. While various exact penalization results exist for
the optimization problem (8) in the literature, stand-alone results on the GNEP are not as many;
they are mostly embedded in methods for solving the game under some CQs without necessarily
claiming the exactness of the penalization. A main difficulty in extending the penalty results for an
optimization problem to the GNEP lies in the fact that while each player’s optimization problem (1)
may have an exact penalty equivalent, the penalty parameter for player ν’s problem in principle
depends on the rivals’ strategy tuple x−ν ; this makes it difficult for a uniform penalty parameter
to exist for all players in an NEP formulation. A related point is highlighted by the proof of the
converse inclusion in Theorem 1 which suggests that the feasibility of a solution of the penalized
NEP is key for that solution to be a solution of the original un-penalized game. This point was
made clear in [26, Theorem 1] and the discussion that follows it where an explanation was offered.
We formally state this requirement in the first part of the following preliminary result whose proof
we omit.
Proposition 3. Suppose that C and the graph of the constraint multifunction X are closed sets.
Let rν(•, x−ν) be a C ν-residual function of the set Xν(x−ν), for all x−ν ∈ C −ν . The following two
statements hold:
(a) Let x∗ be a solution of the penalized NEP (C; θρ;X) for some ρ > 0. Then x∗ is a solution
of the GNEP (C,X; θ) if and only if x∗ belongs to the graph of the multifunction X; i.e.,
x∗,ν ∈ Xν(x∗,−ν) for all ν ∈ [N ].
(b) Suppose that for every x−ν ∈ C −ν , C ν ∩ Xν(x−ν) 6= ∅, θν(•, x−ν) is Lipschitz continuous
with constant Lipν on the set C
ν , and rν(•, x−ν) provides a C ν-Lipschitz error bound with
constant γν > 0 for the set X
ν(x−ν). Then for all ρ > max
ν∈[N ]
Lipν/γν , every equilibrium
solution of the penalized NEP (C; θρ;X) is an equilibrium solution of the GNEP (C,X; θ) and
vice versa. 
One of the main weakness of part (b) of the above proposition is the assumption that C ν ∩Xν(x−ν)
is nonempty for all x−ν in C −ν . The invalidity of this assumption contributes to inequality between
the set of penalized NE and that of the NE of the GNEP; see parts (a) of Example 4 below.
Subsequently, we will provide alternative conditions that bypass this assumption; see Theorem 5
and 11.
3 An Illustrative Example
Before presenting the main results, we offer an example that summarizes several important features
in the penalization of the shared-constrained GNEP (C,D; θ) by residual functions of the common
constraint set D. This example provides the basis for the subsequent results that are motivated by
the various penalized NEPs discussed therein.
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Example 4. Consider the share-constrained GNEP (C,D; θ) with the following specifications:
N = 2; n1 = n2 = 1; θ1(x) = −x1; θ2(x) = −x2; C = [0, 4] × [0, 4]; D = {x ∈ R2 | gi(x) ≤ 0, i =
1, 2, 3}; where g1(x) = x1 +x2−2, g2(x) = 2x1−x2−2, and g3 = −x1 +2x2−2. The constraint set
C ∩D is shown as the gray area in Figure 1. It is easy to see that every point on the line segment
between (4/3, 2/3) and (2/3, 4/3) (i.e., the solid dark line segment in the figure) is a NE of this
GNEP, for which we illustrate various penalizations as follows.
x2
0 x1
g1
g2
g3
2
2
Figure 1: Graph illustration for Example 4
(a) `1 penalization is not exact. Using the `1 residual function r1(x) = ‖g+(x)‖1, the penalized
version of the GNEP (C,D; θ) is the NEP (C; θ + ρ r1). While the `1 residual function is a widely
used residual function that is proven to be effective for exact penalization of many nonlinear pro-
gramming problems, this example shows that it does not work generally for exact penalization of
even shared, linearly constrained GNEPs. Specifically, we can find an equilibrium solution of the
penalized NEP (C; θ + ρ r1) but not one of the GNEP (C,D; θ). The two players’ optimization
problems for the latter NEP are as follows:
minimize
0≤x1≤4
− x1 + ρ
(
[x1 + x2 − 2]+ + [2x1 − x2 − 2]+ + [−x1 + 2x2 − 2]+
)
minimize
0≤x2≤4
− x2 + ρ
(
[x1 + x2 − 2]+ + [2x1 − x2 − 2]+ + [−x1 + 2x2 − 2]+
)
.
By examining the different pieces of the square box C separated by the three lines in the plane, we
can conclude that, for ρ > 1, the set of equilibria of the NEP (C; θ + ρ r1) is {(x1, x2) |x1 + x2 =
2, 2/3 ≤ x1 ≤ 4/3} ∪ (2, 2). It is clear that (2, 2) is not an equilibrium solution of the given GNEP
(C,D; θ).
This negative result is very informative; namely it suggests that unlike the case of an optimization
problem, one needs to be selective in the penalty function in the case of the GNEP; see Theorem 5.
(b) Squared `2 penalization is not exact. The penalized problem with the squared quadratic
residual function r22(x) = ‖g+(x)‖22 is the NEP (C; θ+ ρ r22). It is easy to verify that for any ρ > 0,
every point in {x ∈ C | g1(x) = 1/(2ρ), g2(x) ≤ 0, g3(x) ≤ 0} (i.e., the red line segment in Figure 1)
is an equilibrium solution of this penalized NEP. Even though as ρ gets to infinity, these points
converge to equilibria of the original GNEP, for any finite ρ they do not belong to C ∩D, and thus
are not equilibria of the original GNEP.
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(c) `2 penalization is exact. The penalized problem with the `2 residual function is the NEP
(C; θ + ρ r2). By (5), at x 6∈ D, the gradient of r2(x) is:
∇r2(x) = 1
r2(x)
(
g+1 (x) + 2g
+
2 (x)− g+3 (x)
g+1 (x)− g+2 (x) + 2g+3 (x)
)
For any x in the interior of C \D, one can write down the equilibrium conditions of this NEP as(
−1
−1
)
+ ρ∇r2(x) = 0
which can be shown to have no solution for ρ > 1. Similarly, by checking the respective optimality
conditions of the two players’ optimization problems, one can conclude that any point on the
boundary of C \D is not be an equilibrium solution of the NEP (C; θ+ ρ r2) either. Furthermore,
by part (a) of Proposition 3, it is straightforward to see that any point of C ∩ D that is not an
equilibrium solution of the GNEP (C,D; θ) cannot be one of the NEP (C; θ + ρ r2). The set of
remaining feasible points of NEP (C; θ + ρ r2) is the equilibria set of the GNEP (C,D; θ), i.e.,
{(x1, x2) |x1 + x2 = 2, 2/3 ≤ x1 ≤ 4/3}. Using the directional derivative formula given in (6), it
is possible to verify that every point in this set is an equilibrium solution of the penalized NEP
(C; θ + ρ r2).
(d) `1 penalization is exact for variational equilibria. In this example, every equilibrium
solution of the GNEP (C,D; θ) is a variational equilibrium and hence a solution to the VI (C∩D; Θ).
By penalizing the constraint set D of this VI using the `1 residual function (same as part (a)), we
obtain the mutivalued VI (C; Θ + ρ ∂r1), where ∂ denotes the subdifferential of a convex function
as in convex analysis. It is not difficult to see that the solution set of the penalized VI agrees with
the solution set of VI (C ∩D; Θ), and hence with the equilibrium set of the GNEP (C,D; θ), for
all ρ ≥ 1. This conclusion should be contrasted with part (a) where the penalization of this GNEP
is via the NEP there. In terms of it first-order conditions, the latter NEP is equivalent to the
multivalued VI (C; Θ + ρR), where R is the multifunction R(x) =
3∏
i=1
∂xir1(x) which is a superset
of ∂r1(x). Thus it is not unexpected that the NEP may have more solutions than the given GNEP,
as confirmed by part (a).
(e) `1 penalization is exact when C is restricted. As a result of the failed exact penalization
of the GNEP (C,D; θ) in terms of the NEP (C; θ+ ρ r1) demonstrated in part (a), one could raise
the question of whether the given GNEP may be equivalent to a NEP (C˜, θ + ρ r1) for a certain
Cartesian subset C˜ of C. It turns out that this question has an affirmative answer for this example.
Indeed, a natural way to define this restricted set is C˜ = C˜1 × C˜2 with
C˜1 , {x1 ∈ C1 | ∃x2 ∈ C2 such that (x1, x2) ∈ D }
and similarly for C˜2. For this example, we have C˜1 = C˜2 = [0, 4/3]. We leave it for the reader to
verify that
set of equilibrium solutions of the NEP (C˜; θ + ρ r1)
= set of equilibrium solutions of the GNEP (C˜,D; θ)
= set of equilibrium solutions of the GNEP (C,D; θ).
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The equality between the first and second set illustrates part (a) of Proposition 3. It is possible to
extend the above observation to more general cases. The formal study on this is to be pursued in
the future. 
An important difference between the `1 and `2 penalization is that the residual function in the
latter case is differentiable at points outside the shared constraint set D whereas that in the former
is not. This observation motivates the following consideration about the choice of the residual
function rD. Namely, including the distance function to the set D when the latter is closed and
convex, the residual function rD needs to be at the minimum directionally differentiable. However,
this alone is not enough as illustrated by part (a) in the above example. Thus a suitable condition
on the directional derivatives outside the set D is needed; such a requirement is made explicit in
Theorem 5 in the next section.
4 Main Results for the GNEP (C,D; θ)
Due to the common shared constraint set D, we employ a common residual function that applies to
all players’ individual optimization problems; see Examples 2 and 4 for such a function. Specifically,
throughout this section, we let rD : Rn → R+ be a C-residual function of the shared constrained
set D; i.e., for all x ∈ C, rD(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ D. It then follows that for each x−ν ∈ C− ν ,
rD(•, x−ν) is a C ν-residual function of the set D ν(x−ν) , {yν | (yν , x−ν) ∈ D}. Conversely, we
can construct such an (aggregate) residual function rD from the latter sets D
ν(x−ν). Indeed, for
each ν ∈ [N ], let rν : Rn → R+ be such that for each x−ν ∈ C− ν , rν(•, x−ν) is a C ν-residual
function of the set D ν(x−ν). It is then easy to verify that with rD(x) ,
∑
ν∈[N ]
rν(x
ν , x−ν), it holds
that for all x ∈ C, rD(x) = 0 if and only if x ∈ D. According to part (a) of Proposition 3, a key
requirement for a solution of the penalized NEP (C; θ + ρ rD), where θ + ρ rD is a shorthand for
the vector function (θν + ρ rD)ν∈[N ], to be a solution of the GNEP (C,D; θ) is the membership
of the candidate solution on hand in the shared constraint set D. Moreover, as mentioned above,
the directional differentiability of the residual function rD needs to be strengthened. Taking into
account these two considerations and adapting a key quantity introduced in [14], we present the
following Strong Descent Assumption on residual functions. It would be shown to play a vital role
in guaranteeing exact penalization of a GNEP. For a set S ⊆ Rn and a vector x ∈ S, let T (x;S)
denote the tangent cone at x to S, i.e., the collection of vectors d ∈ Rn such that d = lim
k→∞
xk − x
τk
for some vector sequence {xk} ⊂ S converging to x and some positive scalar sequence {τk} with
τk ↓ 0.
Strong Descent Assumption. Let S and W be two closed sets and rS be a W -residual function
of S. There exists a constant α > 0 such that for every x ∈ W \ S, r ′S(x; d) ≤ −α‖d‖2 for some
nonzero d ∈ T (x;W ). 
The above assumption appears in [14, Theorem 3.2] in the context of a single optimization problem.
While it will be discussed in some more detail momentarily, the assumption essentially requires
that a strong descent direction of the residual function exists at every infeasible point x ∈ W \ S.
Considering the optimization problem (8) with Lipschitz continuous function f(x), the strong
descent assumption would disqualify every point in W \ S as a minimizer of (9) for sufficiently
large ρ. Specialized to each player ν’s optimization problem and to the associated residual function
rD(•, x−ν), this argument leads to the next result on the exact penalization of the GNEP (C,D; θ),
where convexity of the sets C, D and the functions θν(•, x−ν) is not needed.
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Theorem 5. Suppose that C, D are closed subsets of Rn. Assume that each θν(•, x−ν) is di-
rectionally differentiable and locally Lipschitz continuous with constant Lipθ > 0 on C
ν for all
x−ν ∈ C −ν . Let rD be a directionally differentiable C-residual function of D. If there exist positive
constants α and α ′ such that for every x ∈ C \D, either one of the following holds:
(a) for some ν ∈ [N ] and nonzero d ν ∈ T (xν ;C ν) ⊆ Rnν ,
rD(•, x−ν) ′(xν ; d ν) ≤ −α ′ ‖ d ν ‖2 (12)
(b) for some nonzero d ∈ T (x;C),∑
ν∈[N ]
rD(•, x−ν) ′(xν ; d ν) ≤ r ′D(x; d) ≤ −α ‖ d ‖2, (13)
then there exists a finite number ρ¯ such that for every ρ > ρ¯, every equilibrium solution of the NEP
(C; θ + ρrD) is an equilibrium solution of the GNEP (C,D; θ).
Proof. Since ‖ d ‖2 ≥ 1√
N
∑
ν∈[N ]
‖ d ν ‖2, it follows that if (b) holds for some α, then (a) holds with
α ′ = α/
√
N . Hence it suffices to prove the theorem under condition (a). Let x¯ be an equilibrium
solution of the NEP (C; θ + ρ rD). By part (a) of Proposition 3, it suffices to show that x¯ ∈ D.
Assume for contradiction that x¯ ∈ C \D. By assumption, there exist ν ∈ [N ] and d ν ∈ T (x¯ν ;C ν)
such that
rD(•, x¯−ν) ′(x¯ν ; d ν) ≤ −α ′ ‖ d ν ‖2.
By the optimality of x¯ν to player ν’s optimization problem in the NEP (C; θ + ρ rD), we have
θν(•, x¯−ν)′(x¯ν ; d ν) + ρ rD(•, x¯−ν)′(x¯ν ; d ν) ≥ 0
By the Lipschitz continuity of θν(•, x−ν) with constant Lipθ, we obtain
| θν(•, x¯−ν)′(x¯ν ; d ν) | ≤ Lipθ ‖ d ν ‖2.
Hence, It follows that
Lipθ ‖ d ν ‖2 − ρα ′ ‖ dν ‖2 ≥ 0.
By choosing of ρ¯ =, Lipθ/α ′, the above inequality yields a contradiction.
Theorem 5 is a game-theoretic extension of Theorem 1 which pertains to a single optimization
problem. It is useful to note that the assumption of a Lipschitz error bound on the residual
function required in the former theorem is replaced by the strong descent assumptions in the
present game result. Furthermore, in contrary to part (b) of Proposition 3, Theorem 5 does not
require C ν ∩ D ν(x−ν) to be nonempty for all x−ν ∈ C−ν . As shown in Example 4, the later
nonemptiness condition may be too restrictive even for a simple linearly constrained GNEP. We
also note that part (a) of Theorem 5 can be extended in a straightforward way to the general case
of GNEP (C,X; θ). The assumptions required there would involve the strong descent assumption
of rν(•, x−ν). While this result is not explicitly stated in the paper, another sufficient condition
would be provided for the GNEP (C,X; θ) in the case that Xν(•) is finitely representable, see
Theorem 11.
In the remaining of this section, due to the relatively simpler condition, we will focus on refining
part (b) of Theorem 5 by providing some sufficient conditions for (13) to hold. The inequality
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on the left side of (13) is the sum property on the total directional derivative r ′D(x; y − x) with
regard to the partial directional derivatives rD(•, x−ν)′(xν ; y ν − xν) for ν ∈ [N ]. The study of this
relationship for a general function is originated from [2] (see also [55]). It is clear that when rD is
convex, this inequality is equivalent to equality as the directional derivative of a convex function is
subadditive in the direction. Sufficient conditions for the equality include Gaˆteaux differentiability,
and a certain strong property of the directional derivatives that can be found in [51]. In particular,
if the residual function rD is differentiable on C \D (to be precise, differentiable on a set Ω \ D,
where Ω is a open set containing the set C), then the left side inequality in (13) holds readily. This
differentiability assumption will be in place in the rest of the section.
The inequality on the right side of (13) is related to the inequality (15) imposed in Theorem 3.2
in [14] that is for the total penalization of a single optimization problem. The cited theorem dealt
with the optimization problem minimize
x∈D
θ(x) where D is a subset of Rn and assumed in essence
to satisfy the property that there exist positive scalars α and ε such that for all x ∈ Dε \D, some
y ∈ Rn \ {x} exists satisfying r ′D(x; y − x) ≤ −α ‖ y − x ‖, where Dε is an ε-enlargement of the
set D; there was no second set C involved. For partial penalization, the incorporation of the set
C in the strong descent assumption appears to be new. While this restriction reduces the set of
potential descent directions from Rn to T (x;C), it also excludes certain infeasible points under
consideration, thus facilitating the exact penalization. We will provide a more detailed discussion
on this point in subsequent subsections.
4.1 Linear metric regularity
The literature on Lipschitz error bounds for closed convex sets is vast. Summarizing previous
papers that include [47, 43, 38] and many others, Chapter 6 in the monograph [25] provides a
good reference for this theory and its applications. Closely related to Lipschitz error bounds is the
theory of linear metric regularity; see [6, 45]. For our purpose, we can rephrase the strong descent
assumption in terms of the latter theory. Specifically, two closed convex subsets C and D of Rn
with a nonempty intersection are said to be linearly metrically regular if there exists a constant
γ ′ > 0 such that
dist(x;C ∩D) ≤ γ ′ max ( dist(x;C), dist(x;D) ) , ∀x ∈ Rn.
We remark that linear metric regularity is equivalent to the existence of a constant γ1 > 0 such
that
dist(x;C ∩D) ≤ γ1 dist(x;D), ∀x ∈ C. (14)
The above equivalence is known in the literature, e.g., see [45, Theorem 3.1]. Yet we provide a
proof here for completeness. Clearly, the former implies the latter with γ1 = γ. If the latter holds,
let x ∈ Rn be arbitrary and let y be the Euclidean projection of x onto C. We then have
dist(x;C ∩D) ≤ dist(x;C) + dist(y;C ∩D)
≤ dist(x;C) + γ1 dist(x;D) ≤ ( γ1 + 1 ) max ( dist(x;C), dist(x;D) ) ,
establishing the equivalence of linear metric regularity and the inequality (14). It follows from this
equivalence that if C and D are linearly metrically regular, then a C-residual function rD of the set
D satisfies a C-Lipschitz error bound if there exists a constant γ > 0 such that dist(x;D) ≤ γ rD(x)
for all x ∈ C, the latter condition being a usual error bound for D with reference to vectors in C.
The result below shows that linear metric regularity (or equivalently (14)) provides a sufficient
condition for the strong descent assumption to hold.
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Proposition 6. Suppose the two closed convex sets C and D with nonempty intersection are
linearly metrically regular with constant γ ′. Let rD be a convex residual function of D satisfying
a C-Lipschitz error bound for D with constant γ > 0. If rD is differentiable on the set C \D, then
(13) holds.
Proof. It remains to show the right side of (13) holds with α =
1
γ γ ′
. Let x ∈ C \D and y be the
Euclidean projection of x onto the intersection C ∩ D. By the convexity of the residual function
rD, we have
r ′D(x; y − x) ≤ rD(y)− rD(x) = −rD(x) ≤ −γ dist(x;D)
≤ − γ
γ ′
dist(x;C ∩ D) = − γ
γ ′
‖x− y ‖2
as desired.
In addition to the necessary and sufficient inequality (14), there are well-known sufficient conditions
for two closed convex sets to be linearly metrically regular. In particular, we provide in Proposition 7
below a Slater condition (part (a)) and a polyhedrality condition (part (b)). The proof of the first
statement of the proposition follows from [6, Corollary 5, Remark 9 and 10] and and that of the
second statement from the well-known Hoffman error bound for polyhedra [25, Lemma 3.2.3]. In
the result, we use the shorthand “rint” to denote the relative interior of a convex set.
Proposition 7. Two closed convex sets C and D in Rn are linearly metrically regular under either
one of the following two conditions:
(a) C ∩D is bounded and rint(C) ∩ rint(D) 6= ∅;
(b) C and D are both polyhedra. 
Combining part (b) of Theorem 5 and Propositions 6 and 7, we have the following exact penalization
result for the GNEP (C,D; θ) in terms of the penalized NEP (C, θ + ρ rD), for which no proof is
needed.
Corollary 8. Let D be a closed convex set in Rn and C ,
∏
ν∈[N ]
C ν where each C ν is a closed
convex subset of Rnν . Assume that each θν(•, x−ν) is convex and locally Lipschitz continuous on
the set C ν with constant Lipθ > 0 for all x
−ν ∈ C −ν . Let rD be a convex C-residual function of the
set D that is differentiable on C \D. Then under either one of the following two conditions, there
exists a scalar ρ¯ > 0 such that for all ρ > ρ¯, every equilibrium solution of the NEP (C; θ + ρ rD) is
an equilibrium solution of the GNEP (C,D; θ):
(a) rD satisfies a C-Lipschitz error bound for the set D; C ∩D is bounded; and rint(C) ∩ rint(D)
is nonempty;
(b) C and D are both polyhedra. 
Part (b) of Corollary 8 provides a formal generalization of part (c) of the illustrative Example 4.
It also demonstrates that, for shared linearly constrained games and with the use of `q residual
functions for q ∈ (1,∞), the Lipschitz error bound condition required in part (a) is no longer needed.
In the next subsection, we will show that this is true in general for convex finitely representable set
D.
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4.2 Shared finitely representable sets
In this subsection and the rest of the paper, we assume that the set C is compact and convex. We
discuss the GNEP (C,D; θ) where the shared-constrained set D is finitely representable by coupled
differentiable inequalities and linear equations. Specifically, let
D , {x ∈ Rn | g(x) ≤ 0 and h(x) = 0 } (15)
with h(x) = Ax − b for some matrix A ∈ Rp and vector b ∈ Rp and each gj : Rn → R for j ∈ [m]
being convex and differentiable. We separate the linear and nonlinear constraints in D so that
we can state the Slater condition more precisely; see assumption in Lemma 9. We employ the `q
residual function for an arbitrary q ∈ (1,∞) for the set D:
rq(x) ,
∥∥∥∥∥
(
max( g(x), 0 )
h(x)
)∥∥∥∥∥
q
, x ∈ Rn.
The function rq is continuously differentiable on the complement of the set D. Toward the for-
mulation of an exact penaliztion result for the shared constrained GNEP (C,D; θ) with a finitely
representable set D, we establish a consequence of the Slater CQ for the set D. This lemma is
related to many results in the literature; but surprisingly, we cannot find a source that has this
exact result. As such, we give a detailed proof.
Lemma 9. In the above setting, let C be a compact convex set in Rn. Suppose that there exists
a vector x¯ ∈ rintC such that Ax¯ = b and g(x¯) < 0. Then there exists a scalar α > 0 such that for
every x ∈ C \D, a vector x̂ ∈ C exists such that r ′q(x; x̂− x) ≤ −α ‖ x̂− x ‖2.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be such that the closed set Bε(x¯) , {x ∈ C | ‖x− x¯ ‖2 ≤ ε } is contained in
{x ∈ C | g(x) < 0 }. That such a scalar ε exists is by the property of the Slater point x¯. Let Σ be
the family of tuples σ ∈ {0, 1,−1}p such that there exists x ∈ C satisfying sgn (h(x)) = σ, where
sgn (h(x)) is the p-vector whose ith component is equal to the sign of hi(x) if hi(x) 6= 0 and equal
to 0 otherwise. For each σ ∈ Σ, let
C(σ) ,
x ∈ Bε(x¯)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
hi(x) = 0 if σi = 0
hi(x) > 0 if σi = 1
hi(x) < 0 if σi = 0
 .
This set C(σ) must be nonempty because for any σ ∈ Σ, letting xσ be a vector in C such that
sgn (h(xσ)) = σ, by the linearlity of h and the fact that h(x¯) = 0, we have
sgn (h(x¯+ τ(xσ − x¯))) = sgn (h(xσ)) = σ,
thus x¯+ τ(xσ − x¯) ∈ C(σ) for all τ ∈ (0, 1] sufficiently small. Furthermore, since C is convex and
x¯ ∈ rintC, for some τ < 0 that is sufficiently close to 0, x¯+ τ(xσ − x¯) ∈ C and sgn (h(x¯+ τ(xσ −
x¯))) = −σ. Therefore, Σ = −Σ and for every x ∈ C, −sgn h(x) ∈ Σ. For each σ ∈ Σ, define
µ(σ) ,

1 if σ = 0
max
x∈clC(σ)
[
min
i :σi 6=0
σi hi(x)
]
if σ 6= 0.
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where cl denotes the closure of a set. Since min
i :σi 6=0
σi hi(x) is a continuous function of x and clC(σ)
is compact, it follows that maximum in µ(σ) is attained if σ 6= 0. Hence µ(σ) is a positive scalar
for all σ ∈ Σ. Let
y(σ)

, x¯ if σ = 0
∈ argmax
x∈clC(σ)
[
min
i :σi 6=0
σi hi(x)
]
if σ 6= 0.
Note that g(y(σ)) < 0 for all σ ∈ Σ. Now define the scalar
η , min
σ∈Σ
{
µ(σ), min
i∈[m]
[−gi(y(σ)) ]
}
,
which must be positive. For x ∈ C \ D, sgn (h(x)) is a nonzero sign tuple in the family Ξ. Let
x̂ , y(−sgn (h(x))). By the gradient inequality of convex functions and the definition of η, we have
the following:
∇gi(x)T(x̂− x) ≤ gi(x̂) = gi(y(−sgn h(x))) ≤ −η if gi(x) > 0
( sgn hj(x) )∇hj(x)T (x̂− x) ≤ ( sgn hj(x) )hj(y(−sgn h(x))) ≤ −η if hj(x) 6= 0.
By the gradient formula (5), we deduce,
∇rq(x)T ( x̂− x ) = 1
( rq(x) )q−1

∑
i∈[m]
[ max( gi(x), 0 ) ]
q−1 ∇xνgi(x)+
∑
j∈[p]
|hj(x) |q−1 ( sgn hj(x) )∇xνhj(x)

T
( x̂− x )
≤ −η
(
rq−1(x)
rq(x)
)q−1
≤ −η cq−1q ≤ −α ‖ x̂− x‖2,
where cq > 0 is the constant such that cq ‖ • ‖q ≤ ‖ • ‖q−1 and α , η c
q−1
q
2 max
x∈C
‖x ‖2 .
The following exact penalization result for the shared-constrained GNEP is an immediate conse-
quence of the above lemma and part (b) of Theorem 5. There is no need for a proof.
Theorem 10. Let each C ν be a compact convex subset of Rnν and D be given by (15) with
h(x) = Ax − b being affine and each gj(•) being convex and differentiable for all x−ν ∈ C −ν .
Assume that each θν(•, x−ν) is convex and Lipschitz continuous on the set C ν with constant
Lipθ > 0 for all x
−ν ∈ C −ν . Let q ∈ (1,∞) be given. The following two statements hold.
(a) For every ρ > 0, the NEP (C; θ + ρ rq) has an equilibrium solution.
(b) Under the assumption of Lemma 9, ρ¯ > 0 exists such that for every ρ > ρ¯, every equilibrium
solution of the NEP (C; θ + ρ rq) is a equilibrium solution of the GNEP (C,D; θ). 
We note that the property of boundedness and convexity of the sets C ν is used to assert the
existence of a solution to the penalized NEP for any ρ > 0. Without such existence, the result is
not meaningful, unless we have a converse in place to argue that the GNEP will not have a solution
in this case. This is one aspect that we have de-emphasized in the discussion.
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As a final remark of this section, we note that by following similar arguments, we can establish
an exact `1-penalty result for the variational equilibria of the shared-constrained GNEP (C,D; θ)
with a convex, finitely representable set D under the standard Slater condition. The proof would
use the directional derivative formula (7) for this penalty function instead of the gradient formula
(5). The details are omitted. Such a result provides a generalization of part (d) of the illustrative
Example 4.
5 Non-Shared Finitely Representable Sets
In spite of the considerable amount of literature on the exact penalization of a GNEP with coupled
finitely representable constraints, most existing results pertain to problems with only inequality
constraints, see e.g., [23, 24, 31, 36]. The reason for the absence of such an extended treatment
to allow for equality constraints (even linear ones) is not exactly clear; one possible reason might
be that the EMFCQ used in the aforementioned papers is not easily amenable to generalization to
handle equality constraints. In this section, we extend the discussion in Subsection 4.2 to the GNEP
(C,X; θ) with non-shared coupled finitely representable constraints and show that an extended
Slater-type CQ can be imposed to yield the exact penalization for such a GNEP. Specifically, we
let the sets Xν(x−ν) be defined as follows: for each x−ν ∈ C −ν ,
X ν(x−ν) ,
{
xν ∈ Rnν | gν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0 and hν(x) = 0} (16)
with each hν : Rn → Rpν being an affine function and each gνj : Rn → R for j ∈ [mν ] being such
that gνj (•, x−ν) is convex and differentiable for every x−ν ∈ C −ν . We present a result that is a
parallel of Theorem 10 for GNEP (C,X; θ) and then we connect the assumptions used in the result
with the commonly used EMFCQ. Let
rν;q(x) ,
∥∥∥∥∥
(
max( gν(x), 0 )
hν(x)
)∥∥∥∥∥
q
, x ∈ Rn (17)
be the `q residual function for the set X
ν(x−ν). This function rν;q(•, x−ν) is continuously differ-
entiable on the complement of the set Xν(x−ν) for all x−ν . Let rX;q , (rν;q)ν∈[N ]. The penalized
Nash game, NEP (C; θ + ρ rX;q), consists of the following family of optimization problems:{
minimize
xν ∈C ν
θν(x
ν , x−ν) + ρ rν;q(xν , x−ν)
}N
ν=1
,
for a given penalty parameter ρ > 0.
Theorem 11. Let each C ν be a compact convex subset of Rnν . Let each Xν be defined as in (16)
with hν being affine and each gνj (•, x−ν) be convex and differentiable for all x−ν ∈ C −ν . Assume
that each θν(•, x−ν) is convex and Lipschitz continuous on the set C ν with constant Lipθ > 0 for
all x−ν ∈ C −ν . Let q ∈ (1,∞) be given. The following three statements hold.
(a) For every ρ > 0, the NEP (C; θ + ρ rX;q) has an equilibrium solution.
(b) If there exists α > 0 such that for every x ∈ C not in the graph of the multifunction X, there
exists x̂ ∈ C satisfying for some ν̂ ∈ [N ] with xν̂ 6∈ X ν̂(x−ν̂),
• for all i ∈ [mν ], ∇xν̂gν̂i (x ν̂ , x−ν̂)T ( x̂ ν̂ − xν̂ ) ≤ −α if gν̂i (x) > 0, and
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• for all j ∈ [pν ],
[
sgn hν̂j (x)
]
∇xν̂hν̂j (x ν̂ , x−ν̂)T ( x̂ ν̂ − xν̂ ) ≤ −α if hν̂j (x) 6= 0,
then ρ¯ > 0 exists such that for every ρ > ρ¯, every equilibrium solution of the NEP (C; θ + ρ rX;q)
is a equilibrium solution of the GNEP (C,X; θ).
Proof. Assertion (a) follows from a standard existence result for a NEP. In order to prove statement
(b), let x∗ be an equilibrium solution of the NEP (C; θ+ρ rX;q) for some ρ > 0 which will be specified
momentarily. By part (a) of Proposition 3, it suffices to show that x∗ belongs to the graph of the
multifunction X. Assume the contrary; let x̂ and ν̂ be the vector and player label, respectively,
associated with x∗ as stipulated by the assumption in this part. By the gradient formula (5), we
deduce,
∇xν̂rν̂;q(x∗)T ( x̂ ν̂ − x∗,ν̂ )
=
1
rq−1ν̂;q (x∗)

∑
i∈[mν̂ ]
[
max( gν̂i (x
∗), 0 )
]q−1 ∇xν̂gν̂i (x∗)+∑
j∈[pν̂ ]
|hν̂j (x∗) |q−1 ( sgn hν̂j (x∗) )∇xν̂hν̂j (x∗)

T
( x̂ ν̂ − x∗,ν̂ )
≤ −α
(
rν̂,q−1(x∗)
rν̂,q(x∗)
)q−1
≤ −α cq−1q ,
where cq > 0 is the constant such that cq ‖ • ‖q ≤ ‖ • ‖q−1. Since
x∗,ν̂ ∈ minimize
xν̂ ∈C ν̂ ∩X ν̂(x∗,−ν̂)
θν̂(x
ν̂ , x∗,−ν̂) + ρ rν̂;q(xν̂ , x∗,−ν̂),
we deduce
0 ≤ θν̂(•, x∗,−ν̂) ′(x∗,ν̂ ; x̂ ν̂ − x∗,ν̂) + ρ∇xν̂rν̂;q(x∗)T ( x̂ ν̂ − x∗,ν̂ )
≤ Lipθ ‖ x̂ ν̂ − x∗,ν̂ ‖2 − ρα cq−1q ≤ [ Lipθ − ρ α̂ ] ‖ x̂ ν̂ − x∗,ν̂ ‖2.
where α̂ , α c
q−1
q
2 max
x∈C
‖x ‖2 . Provided that ρ > α̂, the above inequality yields a contradiction.
We close this paper by showing that the commonly used EMFCQ is a more restrictive assumption
than the one imposed in part (b) of Theorem 11. Besides the fact that the EMFCQ does not
admit equality constraints, there is another subtle restriction in it; namely, included in this CQ is
a condition on a feasible vector in the graph of the multifunction X, whereas the condition in part
(b) of Theorem 11 does not contain such a restriction. We state the EMFCQ for a convex set C as
follows, see also [12, Definition 4.3].
(EMFCQ) This CQ is said to hold for the GNEP (C,X; θ), where each
Xν(x−ν) =
{
xν | gν(xν , x−ν) ≤ 0} (18)
with each gνi (•, x−ν) being convex and continuously differentiable, if for every x ∈ C and ν ∈ [N ],
there exists a vector x̂ ∈ C such that
∇xνgνi (xν , x−ν)T (x̂ν − xν) < 0 if gνi (xν , x−ν) ≥ 0.
Note that this CQ restricts even a vector x ∈ C belonging to the graph of the multifunction X,
i.e., even for a feasible vector x to the GNEP. The reason to include such vectors in the CQ is so
18
that the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions become valid if x turns out be an equilibrium solution of
the GNEP. It turns out that as far as exact penalization is concerned, the validity of the CQ can
be somewhat relaxed. We have the following result.
Proposition 12. Let each C ν be a convex compact subset of Rnν and each Xν be defined as in
(18) with each gνi (•, x−ν) being convex and continuously differentiable. If EMFCQ holds for the
GNEP (C,X; θ) , then the assumption in part (b) of Theorem is valid.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We first restate the assumption in part (b) in Theorem 11 in
a set-theoretic form that is more conducive to obtain the contradiction. For a given x ∈ C, let
Iν(x) ,
{
i ∈ { 1, · · · ,mν } | g νi (xν , x−ν) > 0
}
be the index set of violated constraints in Xν(x−ν) by xν . The statement that xν 6∈ Xν(x−ν) is
equivalent to Iν(x) 6= ∅. Also let
Î(x) , { ν ∈ [N ] | Iν(x) 6= ∅ }
be the player labels ν for which there is at least one constraint in Xν(x−ν) that is not satisfied by
xν . Thus x 6∈ graph(X) if and only if Î(x) 6= ∅. Coupled with a y ∈ C, define the quantity
αν(x, y) , max
i∈Iν(x)
∇xνg νi (xν , x−ν)T (y ν − xν).
By convention, the maximum over the empty set is equal to −∞. For a given vector x ∈ C not in
graph(X) and a player label ν ∈ Î(x), the quantity αν(x, •) is a continuous function on C. Thus
it is justified to define the scalar
γ , sup
x∈C\graph(X)
[
min
ν∈Î(x)
(
min
y∈C
αν(x, y)
)]
,
where we use sup instead of max because the latter may not be attained. Now, the assumption
in part (b) in Theorem 11 becomes γ < 0. So to prove the proposition by contradiction, suppose
γ ≥ 0. Then there exist a sequence of vectors {xk} ⊂ C and a sequence of positive scalars {εk} ↓ 0
such that for every k, xk 6∈ graph(X) and there exists νk ∈ Î(xk) such that min
y∈C
ανk(x
k, y) ≥ −εk.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the sequence {xk} converges to a vector x∞ ∈ C.
Since there are only finitely many players, it follows that there exists a subsequence {xk}k∈κ and
a player label ν¯ such that for all k ∈ κ, we have ν¯ ∈ Î(xk) and min
y∈C
αν¯(x
k, y) ≥ −εk. Hence for
all y ∈ C, αν¯(xk, y) ≥ −εk for all k ∈ κ. Passing to the limit k(∈ κ) → ∞, we deduce that
min
y∈C
αν¯(x
∞, y) ≥ 0. Since ν¯ ∈ Î(xk) for all k ∈ κ, it follows that g ν¯i (x∞) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Iν¯(x∞).
Thus we have obtained the following
∀ y ∈ C ∃ i such that g ν¯i (x∞) ≥ 0 and ∇xνg ν¯i (x∞,ν¯ , x∞,−ν¯)T (y ν¯ − x∞,ν¯) ≥ 0.
But this contradicts the EMFCQ applied to x∞ which asserts that there exists x̂ ∈ C such that
∇xνg νi (x∞,ν , x∞,−ν)T (x̂ ν − x∞,ν) < 0 whenever g νi (x∞,ν , x∞,−ν) ≥ 0.
Conclusion. In this paper, we have provided a comprehensive exact penalization theory for the
GNEP, by putting together a systematic study of the subject that begins with an illustrative
example and ends with a pair of results for the cases of finitely representable constraint sets. In the
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process, we have clarified the role of error bounds and constraint qualifications in the developed
theory; this is something that has not been sufficiently emphasized in the existing literature of the
GNEP. How these exact penalization results can be put to use in the development of improved
algorithms for computing an equilibrium solution of the GNEP remains to be investigated.
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